The following speech was delivered by Captain Nick Cooper at the international GMDSS conference held in Plymouth, England in March 1997. It is strongly critical of DSC and was probably the most controversial and lively speech made at the conference - being subsequently reported on the front page of Lloyd’s List.

DSC is an essential part of GMDSS, but Captain Cooper rightly points out that most of the practical problems with it so far are as the result of poor equipment design. His speech is highly complimentary towards the ICS Electronics Ltd. DSC2 system, so it is important to point out that Captain Cooper has no association with the company.

Click here to jump to Captain Cooper's views of the DSC2 system

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am not here to pat you on the back and tell you all what a great job you have done in making DSC available world wide, but to bring to your attention some of its very serious shortcomings.

I make no apologies if I shock or offend some of you, because you are the ones who forced this almost totally unworkable, impractical and unreliable system on us in the first place.

As usual with most aspects of ship, bridge, engine room and equipment design, we the seafarers were never consulted, so I feel no qualms at all about attacking DSC, because I had no part in its concept, design or implementation.

I note that of all the Speakers at this years Conference, there are only a few of us who have any experience in the day to day on-board reality of DSC.

The rest of you are Regulators, Rule Makers, Educators, Surveyors, Inspectors and so on, and all have a vested interest in making sure that DSC is not only implemented, but enforced as well.

From what I have seen there appears to be a total lack of interest from any of you in finding out if DSC is actually working. I have yet to be visited on a ship by anybody, least of all the equipment manufacturers, to see how we are getting on, what the results are, or to discuss the problems encountered.

Perhaps you are all too busy installing yet more DSC stations in order to meet the deadlines, at which point you can all turn round and congratulate each other on what a fine job you have done in implementing DSC worldwide, at the same time ignoring the possibility that all you have created is an out of control electronic monster.

Equipment manufacturers are largely to blame for making the DSC equipment overly complicated and user unfriendly.

Are you surprised at the high number of False Alerts and Error Messages?

I’m not. If everyone else, like me, has had to fumble their way through an incomprehensible manual in order to operate badly designed equipment.

There must be thousands of seafarers out there in the same predicament I was in, and they are not getting any help either.

I have operated two GMDSS DSC equipped bulk carriers over the past eighteen months, both of them fitted with DSC equipment made by a well known Far Eastern manufacturer.

The whole thing is a masterpiece of bad design, and looks as if it was thrown together in a hurry using buttons and switches chosen at random from the spare parts bin. The Operations Manual that goes with it would be a joke if the issue at hand were not so serious.

Being totally unfamiliar with this or any other equipment, it took me ten days on my first ship to figure out how to make a Routine Test Call, a search of the Manual from cover to cover having failed to reveal this vital piece of information. I even called in an experienced Radio Operator and Electronics Technician friend of mine, and at the end of two hours he had failed to make head or tail of it.

At the end of the third week I had worked out the Formatted Distress Call, and the Distress Relay and Acknowledgement Calls. I still haven’t figured out how to work the Telex Over Radio, except to receive routine weather broadcasts and the news in Tagalog from Manila Radio.

On the first ship, which was six months old at the time I joined her, the DSC had not been Routine Tested for six months. On the second ship the DSC had not been Routine Tested for four and a half years.

This is not a reflection or criticism of the Masters and Officers who served on those ships before me, but a serious reflection on the design of the equipment and its Operations Manual.

Where were the Regulators, Rule Makers, Surveyors and Inspectors when this gear and its Operations Manual were being dumped on our ships?

Or were you all satisfied that the equipment met all the required Specifications and Regulations, and left it at that?

Did nobody think of finding out if the equipment was actually useable, working and performing as you thought it would, or that the Operations Manual was written in a plain and simple manner?

Did any of you see, or try out, this equipment beforehand? I suspect not, otherwise this particular piece of equipment would not have passed the design stage, with no apparent thought given to ergonomics, practicality or functionality.

The tiny four line LCD screen and the unlit keyboard are two glaring design faults, requiring a torch and glasses, for those of us who need them, to operate it.

The piercing high pitched DSC Alarm produces exactly the wrong reaction from me, which is to shut the thing up as quickly as possible.

If an angry response and total distraction on the bridge is what it was designed to do, then they have succeeded. Why not a soft two tone bing bong alarm that could be tolerated for a few minutes until it can be taken care of?

The instructions for the various DSC functions should be so simply and clearly written that almost anyone, even an untrained operator, can use the equipment.

I know, because I have tried out my own instructions for this particular equipment on various people many times, and they work almost first time every time.

I dread going to a ship with different equipment as it means days, if not weeks, of learning a totally different set of buttons, switches, knobs and keystroke routines.

It won’t be long now before you have your first DSC assisted collision or grounding.

Example: Fully loaded bulk carrier pulling off a loading pier in Brazil, four tugs made fast, pitch black night with heavy tropical rain. DSC Alarm goes off with Error Message, position in Indian Ocean. Repeated six times before the main power breakers were tripped in desperation just to shut the thing up.

Example: Fully loaded 200,000 ton bulk carrier, north bound at night in the narrow TSS in the Gulf of Suez, with oil rigs, platforms and other vessels in close proximity. DSC alarm with another Error Message. This particular Error Message was bounced right round the world and repeated no less than twenty four times by seven different DSC Stations. The position given was 9000 miles away in the Pacific Ocean. This was a very serious distraction to the safe navigation of the vessel and again resulted in the main power breakers being tripped to silence it.

Example: Same vessel, fully loaded, north bound in Dover TSS, another DSC Error Message, repeated sixteen times by four different European DSC Stations. Tripped the breakers again.

Gentlemen, if I have the choice between trying to monitor yet another multiple Error Message, or ploughing into the side of a fully laden tanker or cross channel ferry, you know what my choice will be.

Anyway, how do I know if it is an Error Message, or a genuine Distress Message that has been corrupted by poor propagation?

And conversely, how do I know if the HF DSC Distress Message sent from my rapidly sinking bulk carrier in the South Atlantic is not going to turn up on every DSC screen and printer in the world as an Error Message, and be totally ignored, after bouncing round the world, as each computerised and unmanned DSC Station picks it up and sends it on?

How many cries for help have been ignored or rejected for this reason, because there was only an unthinking computer, and not a human being, between him and salvation.

I can anticipate some of the arguments I am going to get in favour of DSC, as I heard them at last years Conference. You make it all sound so cosy and simple - just push a few buttons and a digitalised Distress Message, having superior carrying and penetration qualities to SSB goes out, is received and acknowledged by a DSC station.

And then what? Back to SSB radio again, or if your ship is sinking very slowly you might have time to use the Telex Over Radio.

The quality of the resulting exchange on SSB with a Coast Radio Station is once again governed by propagation, time of day etc.

Lets say that my digitalised DSC Distress Message has actually got through. Do you think than an MRCC is going to fly a Hercules 1000 miles out into the South Atlantic on the strength of that message alone? Of course not, as they would want confirmation by other means that the Distress was genuine. Back to SSB radio again.

If the resulting exchange is going to be carried out by SSB and the quality, range etc. governed by propagation, why not send out the initial Distress on SSB in the first place?

But is anyone listening on the SSB Distress frequencies any more, or are we all relying on that DSC Distress Message arriving uncorrupted and intact, and alerting the lone operator?

I have analysed three months worth of DSC messages, and I can only find a handful which appear to be genuine.

I am not attacking GMDSS, which I think is a great concept, and which has already saved many lives, but DSC.

If I receive a Distress Relay on Sat-A from say RCC Stavanger or MRCC Falmouth, I have every reason to believe it to be genuine, because a human being not only received and read the initial Distress, but also prepared, typed and sent out the All Ships Alert.

If I hit the Distress Button on any of the Satcom systems, be it telex or telephone, I know I am going to be speaking to an experienced operator who will know what he is talking about. He will probably offer comfort and advice, important human elements in any life threatening situation.

Hands up all those who have heard of, taken part in, or know of a successful Rescue Operation carried out by Satcom via an MRCC……

Yes, Mr. Chairman, you may vote if you wish to, and kindly take a count.
Thank you.

My ideal GMDSS setup would be either Sat A, B or M for Voice, Fax and Data, and two Sat-C terminals.

One Sat-C would be in the Radio Room, which on a properly designed Bridge should be an annexe off the wheelhouse/chartroom.

The second Sat-C terminal would be located at a remote station, adjacent to the stern launched lifeboat for instance. This second set would be small, light and fully portable, with a built-in GPS, so that it could be taken in to the lifeboat. Full messages could then be sent to and received from an MRCC. After all, we had Lifeboat radios until recently. Why not a Lifeboat Sat-C?

The more cynically minded amongst us might be led to believe that GMDSS, and especially DSC, is a major cost cutting opportunity, fuelled by every politicians desire to cut costs in the marine safety budget. Just think of all those Coast Radio Stations and Coast Guard outposts that can be linked to a central computer without a trained, and thus expensive, operator in between.

However, the same pessimistic cynic also accepts that despite this lone cry from the wilderness, DSC is here to stay, like it or not.

Whether he genuinely believes in DSC, or is merely paying lip service to it, is for you to decide.

My Company sent a GMDSS Questionnaire to all its vessels recently and requested all personnel holding a G.O.C. to reply. There were 72 completed forms, which were then analysed by a lecturer at the college where the majority of South Africans take their GMDSS course.

Although most of the questionnaire dealt with the quality and content of the GMDSS course itself, there were answers to questions of a general nature, for instance:-

On the question “What section of the entire GMDSS system are you most insecure with”?, most answered DSC.

On the question “Suggestions for improving the course”, some comments received were:

“On installation of GMDSS equipment on ship I found it took a couple of weeks for me to become confident in what I was doing.”

“A lot more time on practical training and less on cramming in useless information just for the exam.”

“No solution, so many different types of equipment on the market, only hands-on experience on board will help. No substitution for actual experience, course should probably stick to distress procedures.”

This is not a free commercial for the Company concerned, but at last years Conference one manufacturer had his own DSC Controller on display. Ever sceptical, I first tried to find fault with it, and having failed in that I then learned to use it in less than ten minutes, without having to refer to a manual.

This gentlemen, is without a doubt the simplest and easiest piece of electronic equipment I have ever seen.

If I can master its functions in less than ten minutes, then most of you and my seafaring colleagues can do it in less.

If I could step on to the bridge of any ship in the world and find the same DSC Controller, I would have a lot more faith in the system than I do now.

If you all have the power and authority to make and enforce rules and regulations, and determine specifications, why can’t you do the same for any practical design of the equipment itself?

Why can’t you insist that this, or something similar, becomes the industry standard and that nothing else is acceptable? Make the actual transmitters, receivers and so on wherever you like from Toronto to Tokyo, but make it a requirement that this must be the DSC Controller that goes with it.

Instead of forcing more and more legislation on to us, try forcing some on to the equipment manufacturers for a change, because it is on their doorstep that most of the DSC shambles lies.

Years ago the Owners were largely to blame for putting the cheapest, or most “cost effective” as the accountants so coyly put it, equipment on their ships. This is no longer the case, with the advent of one-class shipyard designed ships being turned out on a production line basis.

The shipyard now tell the Owner what GMDSS and other equipment he is getting as part of the overall package, and there are huge financial penalties far exceeding the cost of the equipment itself should the Owner want to put something different on the new building. My Company has run into this impenetrable problem recently with new buildings in two separate Far Eastern shipyards.

Please don ‘t give me the old spiel about free enterprise, free market forces and open competition in the market place being allowed to find a natural balance, losers to the wall etc., because I will answer that with a very pertinent question.

Is my life, and the lives of countless seafarers, to be determined by the equipment manufacturers and now the shipyards, by what is cheapest, and not what is best?

Hands up all those who have heard of, taken part in or know of a successful Rescue Operation carried out by DSC……

Convince me that we need DSC in the first place and I will give it a try.

Until then it is just another millstone around the Masters neck.

In case any of you think I am not taking this subject seriously, here are three months worth of DSC Error Messages……

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Captain Nicholas Cooper, MNI.

Two years pre-sea training at the “General Botha” in Cape Town followed by traditional Cadetship with T. & J. Harrison of Liverpool.

Tried Civil Engineering for a year then went back to sea with the Geest Line for several years and then first command at age 26 tramping coasters around the Caribbean for two years.

Two years command of a 600 ton twin screw motor yacht based in Monte Carlo, during which time had the unique distinction of taking the yacht through the 40 year Special Survey.

Sat for Masters Certificate in 1973 followed by about seven years as Chief Officer and Master on general cargo and reefer ships.

Ten years in Egypt as Port Captain and Marine Surveyor and two years in Houston as Port Captain specialising in the loading of project cargoes.

Returned to sea going in 1992 and currently in Command of Cape Size bulk carriers. Last voyage was taking a fully loaded bulk carrier from Mauritius to Brixham under own power but with only half a rudder, the remainder of the voyage to Rotterdam and Portugal for repairs being under tow.